We analyze the allocative role of the stock market in a multi-sector production economy. Output in each sector is determined by a Cobb-Douglas production function and subject to log-normal productivity shocks. Investors allocate capital across sectors and to an information technology that allows them to learn privately about sectoral shocks. Stock prices provide signals that guide investors in their allocation but depress their incentives to collect information. We show that wealthier economies are better informed and allocate capital more efficiently across sectors. The improved capital allocation leads to larger total factor productivity, GDP and concentration of economic activity. The real and financial sectors are positively associated. These properties are consistent with the evidence.
Introduction
Economists have long argued that the stock market plays an important role in channeling capital to its best uses. Stock prices not only clear the market, they also serve as informative signals that guide investors in their decisions (Bagehot (1873) , Hayek (1945) ). Recent empirical studies provide systematic evidence in support for this view. For example, Wurgler (2000) documents that investments are more sensitive to value addition in countries that are more developed financially and that this sensitivity relates to the informativeness of stock prices. Yet, modeling the link from stock prices to production is difficult, precisely because of their informational role. Several authors relate managers' investment choices to the information conveyed by prices 1 . But they do not explore the macroeconomic implications. These implications are the subject of this paper.
We develop a macroeconomic model of the stock market, capital allocation and production, in which stock prices are informative. The economy is composed of many sectors subject to productivity shocks. Investors allocate capital across sectors and to an information technology that allows them to learn privately about sectoral shocks. We establish the following results.
(i) Wealthier economies invest more in the information technology.
(ii) Thanks to their superior information, they allocate capital more efficiently across sectors. That is, investments are more responsive to productivity shocks.
(iii) Total factor productivity (TFP) and GDP are larger.
(iv) Output is more concentrated across sectors.
(v) The financial sector is more developed. That is, its size, the volume of shares traded and turnover are larger.
(vi) The stock market only performs its informational role if the economy is sufficiently wealthy. Below an income threshold, no information is produced and transmitted.
(vii) The stock market exerts two conflicting effects on the efficiency of the capital allocation: on one hand, stock prices provide useful signals about productivity shocks but, on the other, they depress investors' incentives to collect costly information.
These properties are consistent with the evidence. The literature on finance and growth establishes that financial institutions contribute to growth (see Levine (1997) and (2004) for reviews). In particular, Levine and Zervos (1998), Rousseau and Wachtel (2000) and Carlin and Mayer (2003) document that output grows faster in countries with better-functioning stock markets. Levine and Zervos (1998) show further that TFP growth, rather than capital growth, explains most of GDP growth (Result (iii)). They also report that financial sector development as measured by size, volume of trade and turnover is positively related to output growth (Result (v)).
The importance of information is pointed out. As mentioned above, Wurgler (2000) shows that investments are more sensitive to value addition in countries that are financially more developed. He shows that this sensitivity relates to stock price synchronicity, a measure of the informativeness of stock prices introduced by Morck, Yeung, Yu (2000) . In addition, Carlin and Mayer (2003) report that stock markets exert a stronger effect on innovative industries, i.e. those with high R&D investments and skilled labor (Result (ii)). Moreover, they seem more useful in wealthier economies. Carlin and Mayer (2003) again document that stock markets have a stronger growth effect in more developed countries (Result (vi)). Finally, Imbs and Wacziarg (2003) report that countries go through two stages of sectoral diversification. At first, sectoral diversification increases but, beyond a certain level of income, economic activity starts concentrating again. Our model shows that output tends to concentrate as the economy grows and more information is produced. This requires that income be above a threshold (Result (iv)).
The model belongs to the large literature on trading under asymmetric information. Output within a sector is determined by a Cobb-Douglas production function that displays decreasing returns to capital and is subject to log-normal productivity shocks. This setup, by departing from the usual Gaussian-linear structure, allows to capture the complementarity between technologies and capital that renders the allocation of capital essential, and to ensure that capital and output remain positive. The drawback, however, is that no closed-from expression is known for asset demands under the resulting log-normal payoffs. For this reason, we resort to the small-risk expansion introduced by Peress (2004) .
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the economy. Section 3 defines the equilibrium concept. Section 4 characterizes the capital allocation, output and the real sector for a given quality of information. Section 5 determines the quality of information and examines the financial sector. Section 6 concludes. Proofs are relegated to the appendix.
The economy
Our goal is to investigate how the stock market enhances productivity and output thanks to an efficient allocation of capital. Stock prices play a dual role: they clear the market and they convey information. Because of the latter role, closed-form solutions to models of trading with private information rarely exist. The few exceptions typically rely on assumptions that render prices linear in payoffs, signals and noise. They assume on one hand, constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) or risk neutral preferences, and on the other hand, normally distributed random variables 2 . These assumptions imply that the demand for assets is linear in their expected payoffs and that expected payoffs are linear in signals, including prices, thus making prices linear in the random variables.
These assumptions are problematic for our purpose. Stock payoffs are a fraction of firms' output, i.e. a combination of technology shocks and capital, while capital itself is a function of prices (it equals the number of shares issued multiplied by the price). Therefore, a production function linear in shocks and capital would be required to obtain expected payoffs linear in prices. Such a production function would neither capture the complementarity between technologies and capital, nor allow for returns to capital to decrease. In addition, normally distributed shocks imply that capital and output can be negative. Ideally, we would like to use a CobbDouglas production function subject to log-normal shocks. Unfortunately, no closed-from expression is known for asset demands under log-normal payoffs. For this reason, we resort to a small-risk expansion. Following Peress (2004), we build a sequence of economies in which fundamentals (payoffs, risks and costs) are scaled appropriately by a parameter z. The model is solved in closed-form by driving z toward zero. Peress (2004) demonstrates the convergence and the accuracy of this approximation. Throughout the paper, we assume that the scaling factor z is small enough for the approximation to be valid.
The main features of the economy are the following. The economy is composed of several sectors, each subject to a technology shock and represented by a firm. Firms raise capital in the stock market. To improve their investment decisions, agents may acquire information about the technology shocks. Their information is reflected in stock prices, but only partially because of the presence of noise. Prices in turn help all investors in their portfolio allocations. Time consists of 3 periods, a planning period (t = 0), an investment period (t = 1) and a production period (t = 2). The model is further defined as follows.
Technologies

Physical technologies
The economy is composed of M sectors. In a sector, many identical firms compete and aggregate into one representative firm so that a (representative) firm corresponds to a technology shock. Capital is deployed during the investment period (t = 1) and output is realized in the production period (t = 2). Output within a sector, Y m , is determined by a neoclassical risky technology that displays decreasing returns to capital:
where A m is a sector m-wide technology shock, K m is the stock of capital allocated to sector m and β is a parameter that measures the rate of decline of the marginal product of capital (0 < β < 1).
The sectoral shocks A m (m = 1 to M ) are assumed to be log-normally distributed and independent from implies that wealthier agents acquire more information because they invest on a larger scale. For example, if preferences display constant relative risk aversion (CRRA), then τ is linear in w.
Agents only consume in the production period (t = 2) and their objective is to maximize expected utility from consumption. We do not focus on agents' saving decision but on how they allocate their exogenous income across sectors. As described below, stock m (m = 1, ..., M ) is a claim to the output of sector-m firms. Agents may allocate resources to the information technology to learn about shocks and improve their portfolios. We write f m l for agent l's portfolio weights or fractions, i.e. the value of her investment in stock m divided by her wealth.
Assets
Shares of representative firms (sectors) trade on the stock market. One share of firm m has a price of P m . The number of shares issued is irrelevant and normalized to 1. To ensure that agents have an incentive to collect costly information in an environment in which it gets revealed to competitors through prices, we need more sources of randomness than assets. There are several ways of adding randomness to the model. We follow the literature in assuming that the residual supply of shares of firm m is risky (Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) ).
We assume that foreigners purchase all domestic shares except for a random number. Specifically, they invest We posit a noisy supply of this form, with a mean E(θ)τ (w) and variance σ 2 θ τ (w) 2 /z, to ensure that noise remains commensurate with the size of the economy and the magnitude of risk. If we did not scale noise appropriately, it would disappear in the limit when the economy is large (w large) or when risk is small (z small), leading to the Grossman-Stiglitz paradox: no agent acquires any information because it is perfectly revealed; but it is precisely when no one is informed that information is the most profitable.
A riskless asset is available on the international market. Domestic investors may borrow freely (lend) at the riskless rate by issuing bonds to (buying bonds from) foreigners. The riskless rate of return is denoted
Because the economy under study is assumed to be small in relation to the world economy, the accumulation of assets in that economy has a negligible impact on the path of the world interest rate r f , which is therefore treated as exogenous.
Timing
The timeline is depicted in figure 1 . Agents decisions consist of two steps. First in the planning stage (t = 0), they decide how much resources to devote to collecting information. Second in the investment stage (t = 1), markets open, agents observe their private signals (if any) and allocate their income to the different assets using private and public signals. The latter three events take place simultaneously. They consume the proceeds from their investments in the production period (t = 2). We turn to the definition of the equilibrium.
Equilibrium concept
We describe the equilibrium concept for this economy. We start from individual maximization (conditions (i) and (ii)) and proceed to market aggregation (conditions (iii) and (iv)). Agents choose how much information to collect (planning stage), and how to invest their income (investment stage). In equilibrium, stock prices contain useful information. F l ≡ {s l , P } denotes investor l's information set and E l (. | F l ) and E l (.) refer respectively to her ex post (t = 1) and ex ante expectations (t = 0). The problem is simplified by noting that, by symmetry, agent l chooses the same precision across stocks, i.e. x m l = x l for all m. Furthermore, because agents are endowed with the same income, they choose the same precision, i.e. x l = x for all l 5 .
(i) In the investment stage, agent l sets her portfolio weights f l using both public and private signals (P and s l with a precision x inherited from the planning stage). Because technology displays decreasing returns to capital, the return an investor expects from a sector and therefore the portfolio weight she chooses depend on the stock of capital in that sector. Agents are atomistic and take as given prices and the distribution of capital across sectors.
Their problem can be expressed formally as:
where c l , R l and R m denote respectively agent l 0 s consumption, the (simple) return on her portfolio and on
MC(x)z represents an agent's total information expenditure. Agents may borrow and short stocks if they wish. Call v the value function for this problem.
(ii) In the planning stage, the agent selects the precision of her signals. How much information she acquires depends on how much information is collected in aggregate and revealed through prices. Let X denote the average precision chosen by investors. Agent l selects the precision of her signals, x = x(w, X), in order to maximize her expected utility, taking as given the average precision in the economy X, and averaging over all the possible realizations of s l , P and K:
(iii) In equilibrium, prices clear the market for stocks. Individuals' investments, when aggregated, coincide with the (assumed) capital stock. These two requirements are equivalent given that capital consists exclusively of newly raised funds. Furthermore, the capital stock in any sector equals the number of shares issued, 1, times the price in that sector. Formally, Z
The average precision X, which was taken as given in step (ii), equals the precision chosen by investors (recall that investors are ex ante identical and choose the same precision):
4 Capital allocation, production and the real sector
We determine the equilibrium allocation of capital and derive output. Throughout this section, we take as given the precision of investors' signals, which we endogenize in the next section. We guess that capital and prices are approximately, i.e. at the order z, log-linear functions of technology and supply shocks, solve for portfolios, derive the equilibrium capital allocation and prices, and check that the guess is valid. We begin with a description of two benchmark economies, one in which nothing is known about the technology shocks and another in which they are observed perfectly. They will serve as reference points when we discuss the role of information.
Benchmark economies Theorem 1 (Benchmark economies)
• No-information economy -The allocation of capital to sector m equals K mN = exp(k mN z) where
where
• Perfect-information economy -The allocation of capital to sector m equals K mP = exp(k mP z) where
We comment first on the behavior of capital. When nothing is known about the technology shocks, prices and capital do not relate to technology shocks, but depend negatively on supply shocks. Sectors hit by a low (high)
foreign demand, offer a large (small) residual supply to domestic investors who set a low (high) price, which in turn reduces the stock of capital. When the technology shocks are known, prices and capital are perfectly correlated to technology shocks but independent from supply shocks. The stocks are riskless and domestic capital flows to equalize expected returns to the riskfree rate in all sectors.
To understand the behavior of output, note that shocks to technology and capital are beneficial because output is a convex function of these shocks, so good shocks more than compensate for bad ones 6 . Formally,
is larger the more capital and technology shocks comove and the more capital varies across sectors. In the no-information economy, capital is not related to technology shocks but it does fluctuate across sectors because of the supply shocks. In the perfect-information economy, capital fluctuates though it is immune from supply shocks because it tracks technology shocks perfectly.
Two further remarks will set the stage for the analysis in the next sections. First, output is on average larger in the perfect-information than in the no-information economy, reflecting the usefulness of information . Second, both equilibria are invariant to changes in investors' income. The price of a stock is obtained by equating domestic investors' demand to the residual supply, i.e. to the number of shares outstanding net of foreigners' demand. Portfolio weights are (approximately) proportional to relative risk tolerance so domestic investors' demand grows in proportion to absolute risk tolerance. So does the residual supply by assumption.
Therefore, the same prices and capital allocation obtain for all levels risk tolerance. We shall see that this implication no longer holds when information can be acquired. We are now ready for the analysis of an imperfectinformation economy. We start with the allocation of capital.
Capital allocation Theorem 2 (Capital allocation)
Assume the information decisions have been made, i.e. the average precision in the economy, X, is given. There exists a log-linear rational expectations equilibrium.
• The allocation of capital to sector m equals K m = exp(k m z) where
• Capital is distributed across sectors with mean and variance given by
and
• The price of stock m equals the amount of capital invested in that sector, P m = K m .
• Investor l who receives a signal s m l allocates a fraction of her wealth to stock m such that
The theorem confirms our initial guess that capital and prices are log-linear functions of technology and supply shocks. means that funds tend to flow to the most productive sectors. Informed investors want to hold more shares of a firm with a high technology shock a m , which pushes its price and capital stock up relative to a stock with the same supply shock θ m but lower technology shock. Furthermore, the elasticity increases with the level of information (k a increases with X). That is, more (less) capital is allocated to high (low) technology-shock sectors in better-informed economies. In particular, the capital allocation corresponds to those indicated in theorem 1 when there is no information (X = 0 and k a = 0 so sectors receive capital whatever their technology shock) or when information is perfect (X = ∞ and k a = 1 so the capital stock in a sector is proportional to its technology shock). Thus, better-informed economies allocate capital more efficiently.
The theorem also highlights the informational function performed by the stock market. This can best be understood by comparison to an economy in which prices do not convey any information. In such an economy, investors' total precision is reduced to 1/σ 2 a + X < h(X) and the elasticity of investments to productivity shocks 
Peress (2004) demonstrates the convergence and the accuracy of the approximation.
Fourth, the law of large numbers implies that the individual signals add up to their conditional mean, a m .
Therefore, the aggregate demand is linear in a m and k m and, equating it to the residual supply τ (w)θ m , yields an equilibrium capital allocation linear in a m and θ m as guessed. The next theorem describes production.
Production Theorem 3 (Production)
Assume the information decisions have been made, i.e. the average precision in the economy, X, is given.
• Output in sector m equals Y m = exp(y m z) where
• Output is distributed across sectors with mean and variance given by
In the previous section, we emphasized the stock market's role in raising funds and directing them to the best sectors. The theorem shows how investments translate into greater aggregate output. Output in sector m, There are two channels through which information enhances output. First and most important, a given stock of capital is more efficiently distributed across sectors. Second, more capital is invested in risky technologies overall, at the expense of the riskless asset. To isolate the first channel which is the focus of the paper, we can estimate an economy-wide production function (which is more accurate when the number of sectors is large):
The term
} is known in the growth literature as the "Solow residual" or "total factor productivity" (TFP). It encompasses any factor, beyond labor and capital, that contributes to output. We focus here on its endogenous component,
, reflects the more efficient distribution of capital, which better-informed economies can achieve. It increases with the average precision X, starting from 0 in the noinformation economy (capital is distributed independently from technology shocks) and rising up to σ economy. Hence, the availability of information expands the production possibility set. The more informed the economy (greater X), the further away the production possibility set is expanded. This expansion occurs thanks to a more efficient allocation of capital but is limited by its declining marginal product. The next section describes the behavior of the real economy as information improves.
The real sector
We relate several characteristics of the real sector to the average precision (we will examine the financial sector in the next section).
Theorem 4 (The impact of information on the real sector)
Suppose information improves (X increases).
(i) Investments are more sensitive to productivity shocks (dk a /dX ≥ 0).
(ii) Total factor productivity increases • Agents with wage w collect information if and only if their wage exceeds a threshold w * where
• In that case, the equilibrium precision per stock, X ≡ X(w), is such that
The theorem describes how much information agents collect. Its proof consists of two steps. First, given the average precision X, derive the first order condition for an investor's precision, x(w, X). Second, set X = x(w, X) to obtain the equilibrium precision X. The theorem implies that more information is collected in wealthier economies. This can be seen on two levels. First, when w * > 0, agents collect information only if they are wealthy enough. Thus, the stock market only performs its informational role if the economy is sufficiently wealthy. w * > 0 happens in particular when E(θ) is large. In that case, agents expect to hold a large number of shares and therefore find information valuable. When w * ≤ 0, agents collect information regardless of their income. w * ≤ 0 happens in particular when C 0 (0) = 0, i.e. the first piece of information is virtually free 7 .
Second, when agents do collect information, the precision of their signals increases with their income. This is illustrated by figure 2. The increasing (decreasing) curve represents the left (right) hand side of equation 17.
The equilibrium precision choice is located at their intersection. The picture also shows that the equilibrium precision is larger for wealthier economies (the increasing curve shifts downwards) and is confirmed by figure 3 .
This property obtains because the benefit from information rises with the scale of investment whereas its cost does not. Indeed, a wealthier economy is willing to bear more risk (absolute risk tolerance rises with income by assumption), and to allocate more capital to each risky technology. This induces it to acquire more information.
In that sense, information generates increasing returns with respect to the scale of investment. This property holds in spite of a convex information cost which generates decreasing returns with respect to the signal precision.
It is formalized in theorem 6.
We can see from equation 17 how investors' inability to appropriate the full benefit from their private information limits the production of information. The amount of information revealed by prices equals X 2 /σ 2 θ . If there were no public revelation, this term would vanish from h(X) in both the numerator and the denominator.
The right hand side of the equation and hence the equilibrium precision would be larger. Thus, investors limit their collection of private information because it gets partially revealed to others through their trades. But it is precisely because prices reveal information that the stock market is useful in allocating resources. We characterize next the financial sector.
The financial sector
We consider the following financial variables. Stock-market capitalization is the value of all firms listed on the exchange and equals E( P M m=1 P m ) = ME(K m ) on average. The ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP, 7 Alternatively when (ii) Assume that
The ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP rises
(iii) Expected stock returns and their variance decline.
(iv) The volume of trade and turnover rise.
Expected stock returns and their variance decline. The average excess return shrinks faster than the conditional standard deviation of returns, so their ratio 
Conclusion
We analyze the allocative role of the stock market in a multi-sector production economy. Output in each sector is determined by a Cobb-Douglas production function and subject to log-normal productivity shocks. Investors allocate capital across sectors and to an information technology that allows them to learn privately about sectoral shocks. Stock prices provide signals that guide investors in their allocation but depress their incentives to collect information. We show that wealthier economies are better informed and allocate capital more efficiently across sectors. The improved capital allocation leads to larger total factor productivity, GDP and concentration of economic activity. The real and financial sectors are positively associated. These properties are consistent with the evidence.
See the proof of theorem 2 and set X = 0 for the no-information economy and X = ∞ for the perfect-information economy.
B Proof of theorem 2 (Capital allocation)
The proof of theorem 1 builds on Peress (2004) . We guess that the equilibrium capital allocation is given by equations 5 to 7 and solve for an investor's optimal portfolio by driving z toward zero (recall that precision choices are taken as given at this stage). The first step is to relate stock payoffs to the technology shocks and capital.
• Stock payoffs
The single share of the firm entitles stockholders to its entire output, • Signal extraction
The average precision in the economy is X and the precision of agent l 0 s signal is x m l . We show in the proof of theorem 6 below that chosen precisions are identical across stocks and investors so we write x for x 
and a s l b h≡x V ar l (a m z | F l ) falls as the precision of the private signal x (the public signal X 2 /σ
We solve for f m l and insert τ (w) ≡ −U 0 (w)/U 00 (w) to obtain the fraction of wealth allocated to stock m (at the order 0 in z):
Substituting the above expression for E l (r m z | F l ) and V ar l (r m z | F l ) yields:
¾ Setting x = X leads to equation 10. The final step consists in aggregating stock demands and clearing the market.
• Market clearing
We multiply equation 10 by investors' income w and aggregate over all investors to obtain the aggregate demand for stock m at the order 0 in z: the left hand side is the aggregate demand for the stock (the term in parenthesis is the foreign demand) and the right hand side is the aggregate supply (recall that the number of shares issued is normalized to 1). Plugging in the expression for the domestic demand yields the equilibrium prices and capital allocation given by theorem 2. They are linear in a m and θ m as guessed.
C Proof of theorem 3 (Production)
The proof is a straightforward consequence of theorem 2 since y m = a m + βk m .
D Proof of theorem 4 (The impact of information on the real sector)
(i) Investment elasticity:
. The numerator can be written as a polynomial in X whose coefficients are positive if
(iv) and (v) Variance and average of output:
3 . The numerator can be written as a polynomial in X whose coeffi-
The numerator can be written as a polynomial in X whose coefficients are positive if (1−β) (E(θ) + 1/2) /β ≥ 1/3 and σ 
E Proof of theorem 5 (Information acquisition)
We proceed in two steps. First, we find an investor's optimal precision x = x(X) given the average precision in the economy X. Then we solve for the equilibrium precision by equating the two, X = x(X)
• Investors' demand for information
To solve the information acquisition problem faced by an investor, we approximate the expected utility of an investor who chooses a signal of precision 
is investor l's Sharpe ratio on stock m, a function of s (ii) Ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP: the ratio equals ( 
